From 800b2c4b6115845f6bf15d90484b3e80e81a606f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: t <t@tjp.lol>
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 15:36:20 -0600
Subject: Load extensions via unified policy, entry/activate, rocks and paths

Replace the split [tools]/[extensions] config sections and the two-stage
load gate with a single model:

- [extensions] is now one policy resolved across all layers. Rules from
  every layer are kept (not clobbered) and resolved by last-match-wins
  after sorting by (layer, glob specificity, deny-last), so a base layer
  can carve one name out of an otherwise-denied group and a higher layer's
  broad rule still wins. Default is allow; whitelist via deny=["**"].
- Registration is deferred: a source returns an entry {name, activate}
  (or a list, or the sugar tool table), is always eval'd side-effect-free,
  and only permitted names get activate()d. Identity is the declared name,
  not the filename. Collapses the old pre/post-load two-stage gate.
- The loader runs two passes (eval -> shadow -> filter -> activate) with
  precedence project>user>base and, within a layer, rocks<paths<dir.
- extensions.paths adds extra scan dirs; extensions.rocks loads luarocks
  packages as extension sources (require-as-entries). Startup installs
  only missing rocks (no per-launch network hit); panto update force-
  (re)installs every configured rock.

deny is a feature toggle, not a security boundary: rocks is where registry
code enters, so the pin list is the trust boundary. Rock integrity
(first-party GPG signing + --verify) is designed but not yet wired; until
then rocks pins which version, not which bytes.

Breaking: [tools] is removed; extensions must return entries. Built-in
tools and the wc example keep working via the sugar tool form.
---
 src/main.zig | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'src/main.zig')

diff --git a/src/main.zig b/src/main.zig
index 2c5b414..86f1cb1 100644
--- a/src/main.zig
+++ b/src/main.zig
@@ -388,6 +388,17 @@ pub fn main(init: std.process.Init) !void {
     // chance to register tools that might want to yield.
     try rt.installScheduler();
 
+    // Install any user rocks (`extensions.rocks`) into the shared tree so the
+    // loader can `require` them below. Best-effort: a rock that fails to
+    // install is logged and skipped — the REPL still starts. This is where
+    // registry code enters, so it is the code-execution trust boundary; the
+    // allow/deny policy is a feature toggle, not a security gate.
+    for (app_config.ext_rocks) |spec| {
+        _ = luarocks_runtime.installRockIfMissing(luarocks_rt, alloc, io, spec.value) catch |err| {
+            std.log.err("extensions.rocks: failed to install '{s}': {t}", .{ spec.value, err });
+        };
+    }
+
     // Discover Lua extensions across three layers — base
     // (<data home>/agent), user ($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/panto or
     // $HOME/.config/panto), and project (./.panto). Project shadows
@@ -399,10 +410,9 @@ pub fn main(init: std.process.Init) !void {
         init.environ_map,
         luarocks_rt.layout.agent_dir,
         rt,
-        .{
-            .extensions = &app_config.extensions,
-            .tools = &app_config.tools,
-        },
+        &app_config.extensions,
+        app_config.ext_paths,
+        app_config.ext_rocks,
     ) catch |err| {
         std.log.err("extension discovery failed: {t}", .{err});
         return err;
-- 
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